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Abstract
Pollution is a major cause of mortality, leading to substantial inequal-
ities in lifetime well-being across individuals. This paper characterizes
the optimal level of pollution in a two-period OLG economy where pol-
lution deteriorates survival conditions. We compare two long-run social
optima: on the one hand, the average utilitarian optimum, where the
long-run average well-being is maximized, and, on the other hand, the
ex post egalitarian optimum, where the well-being of the worst-o¤ at the
stationary equilibrium is maximized. It is shown that the ex post egali-
tarian optimum involves a higher level of pollution in comparison with the
utilitarian optimum. This result is robust to introducing health expendi-
tures in the survival function. Finally, we examine the decentralization of
those two social optima, and we compare the associated optimal taxes on
capital income aimed at internalizing the pollution externality.
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1 Introduction
Environmental pollution is a major cause of mortality around the world. Various
aspects of the environment a¤ect mortality outcomes, including air pollution,
water pollution and soil pollution.1 The impact of environmental quality on
human longevity can be illustrated by the signicant overmortality due to air
pollution. According to a recent study by WHO (2014), about 7 million deaths
can be imputed, around the world, to (indoor and outdoor) air pollution in
2012. A large proportion of premature deaths due to air pollution take place in
urban areas around the developing world.2
Following the empirical evidence supporting the existence of an environ-
mental Kuznetz curve (Grossman and Krueger 1995), the theory of long-run
economic growth has progressively taken pollution into account.3 Within the
overlapping generations (OLG) setting, the introduction of pollution is due to
John and Pecchenino (1994) and John et al (1995). In those models, capital
accumulation does not only inuence the consumption possibilities of future
generations: it also a¤ects the quality of the natural environment. Following
those works, various OLG models studied the growth/pollution relationship and
the optimal public intervention in that context.4
Whereas those OLG models assumed a xed lifetime, a strong emphasis was
recently laid, within OLG models, on the inuence of pollution on mortality.
The impact of pollution on survival conditions introduces a feedback mechanism
in the modeling of economic dynamics. If pollution deteriorates life expectancy,
this is likely to lead to lower savings, to lower capital, and, in ne, to lower
future pollution levels, which, in turn, will improve future survival prospects.
Hence, making survival conditions dependent on pollution complicates long-run
dynamics (see Mariani et al 2010, Balestra and Dottori 2012).
Besides the study of long-run dynamics, the pollution/mortality relationship
raises also deep challenges for policy-makers. As studied by Jouvet et al (2010)
in an OLG model where pollution reduces (certain) longevity, the internalization
of pollution externalities requires the design of appropriate scal instruments
(i.e. Pigouvian taxes). But internalizing externalities is not the only goal of
public policy in the presence of pollution. Actually, in real life, pollution is
not only a source of externalities, it is also a cause of large inequalities in
longevity. Because of pollution, some individuals turn out to have shorter lives,
whereas other individuals can still enjoy a long life. As a consequence, longevity
inequalities due to pollution generate large inequalities in lifetime well-being.
What should governments do in front of those inequalities? To answer that
question, let us consider Fleurbaeys theory of fairness (Fleurbaey 2008). Fleur-
baey distinguishes between two kinds of inequalities: on the one hand, inequal-
ities due to circumstances (on which individuals have no control), and, on the
1On the various e¤ects of environmental quality on human longevity, see Sartor (2002).
2Other important studies on the impact of air pollution on mortality include Kinney and
Ozkanyak (1991), Finkelstein et al (2003), Peng et al (2005), and Laden et al (2006).
3For a survey on the environmental Kuznetz curve, see Dinda (2004).
4See Jouvet et al (2000), Ono (2002), Jouvet el al (2005), and Nakabayashi (2010).
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other hand, inequalities due to responsibility variables (on which individuals
have some control). According to Fleurbaeys Principle of Compensation, in-
equalities due to circumstances should be abolished. The Principle of Com-
pensation is most relevant for longevity inequalities due to pollution. Indeed,
given that survival conditions often depend on the aggregate level of pollution,
and given that each individual has, on his own, little control on the aggregate
pollution level, pollution victims can hardly be regarded as responsible for their
premature death. Hence the question of their compensation matters.
Standard normative criteria such as utilitarianism cannot, in general, jus-
tify the compensation of pollution victims. As it is well-known, utilitarianism
makes sense when the population under study is homogeneous.5 However, once
we consider a population where individuals di¤er on fundamental aspects (a¤ect-
ing their capacity to convert resources into well-being), the utilitarian criterion
often leads to a counterintuitive treatment of disadvantaged individuals.6 At
the utilitarian social optimum, there remain, in general, large inequalities in re-
alized lifetime well-being across individuals having unequal lifetimes. However,
when those inequalities are due to circumstances, there is a strong motivation
for compensating those short-lived persons. This intuition motivated the de-
velopment of alternative normative criteria aimed at minimizing inequalities in
realized lifetime well-being between short-lived and long-lived individuals (see
Fleurbaey and Ponthiere 2013 and Fleurbaey et al 2014).
This paper aims at examining the compensation of pollution victims. For
that purpose, we will rst compare the optimal pollution level under two social
optima: on the one hand, the average utilitarian optimum, where the long-run
average well-being is maximized, and, on the other hand, the ex post egalitarian
optimum, where the well-being of the worst-o¤ at the stationary equilibrium
is maximized. Then, we will examine the decentralization of those two social
optima by means of scal instruments. That comparison will allow us to assess
the robustness of the optimal policy to the underlying social welfare function,
by comparing the optimal policies under those social objectives.
For that purpose, we consider a two-period OLG economy with physical
capital accumulation, where production generates some pollution, which, in
turn, reduces life expectancy. Our normative analysis consists of a long-run
analysis: we examine what kind of stationary equilibrium would be selected
under the two social welfare functions under comparison. Similarly, our policy
analysis is a long-run policy analysis: we consider the scal instruments required
for the decentralization of the long-run social optima under study.
Anticipating our results, we show that the ex post egalitarian optimum in-
volves a higher level of pollution in comparison with the average utilitarian
optimum. This result is robust to introducing health expenditures in the sur-
5This is the case in Jouvet et al (2010), where pollution a¤ects the duration of the old age
lived by all members of a cohort.
6Those limits were emphasized, in di¤erent contexts, by Arrow (1971), Sen (1973) and Mir-
rlees (1982). If, for instance, handicapped persons exhibit a lower capacity to convert resources
into well-being, utilitarianism will penalize them, by allocating fewer resources to them. But
many would argue that we should give not less, but more resources to the handicapped.
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vival function. When examining the decentralization of those two social optima,
we compare the associated optimal taxes on capital income aimed at internal-
izing the pollution externality, and we show that the optimal taxes on capital
income obtained under those two optima di¤er strongly, to an extent that de-
pends on the shape of individual preferences and on the form of the survival
process. The decentralization of the ex post egalitarian optimum requires, in
general, a higher tax on capital income than under utilitarianism, but that tax is
decreasing with the extent to which pollution a¤ects survival conditions (unlike
under utilitarianism). Thus, the design of the optimal environmental policy is
strongly sensitive to the underlying social objective, and, in particular, to the
attention paid to the compensation of the short-lived.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of
a simple OLG economy with pollution and risky lifetime. The utilitarian social
optimum is characterized in Section 3. Section 4 derives the ex post egalitarian
social optimum, and compares it with the utilitarian optimum. Section 5 ex-
amines the robustness of the di¤erences between the two social optima to the
introduction of health expenditures as an input in the survival function. Then,
Section 6 considers the decentralization of the two social optima, and compare
the associated optimal public policies. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2 The model
We consider an OLG economy with pollution and risky lifetime. Time is discrete
and goes from 0 to innity. All cohorts are, at birth, of size N > 0. Longevity
is risky: all individuals live the rst period, during which they work, save and
consume, but only some fraction of each cohort will survive to the second period,
and enjoy the retirement period.
Survival conditions All individuals born at time t live the rst period for
sure, but only a fraction t+1 of that cohort will survive to the second period.
The proportion of survivors depends on the level of pollution at period t:
t+1 =  (Pt) (1)
We assume, as usual, that 0 < t+1 < 1 8Pt > 0, and that 
0 (Pt+1) < 0 and
00 (Pt+1) < 0.
Production The production process involves capital Kt and labour Lt,
according to the following production function:
Yt = F (Kt; Lt) (2)
where Yt denotes the output at time t, Kt is the stock of capital, and Lt is the
labour force. Given that only young individuals work, and given that the size of
each cohort is, at birth, identical, we have Lt = N 8t. As usual, we assume that
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the production function F () is positively valued, and is increasing and strictly
concave with respect to capital. Capital depreciates at a rate .
Assuming constant returns to scale, the production function can be written
as:
yt = f(kt) (3)
where yt 
Yt
N
is the output per worker, f(kt)  F (kt; 1) is the production
function in intensive terms, and kt 
Kt
N
is the capital per worker. As examined
in de la Croix and Michel (2002), the production function f(kt) satises the
properties: f 0(kt) > 0 and f
00(kt) < 0.
Pollution The production process generates some pollution. Polluting
emissions Et are proportional to the total output:
7
Et = F (Kt; Lt) (4)
where  > 0 captures the extent to which the production process leads to
polluting emissions.
The dynamics of pollution is given by the equation:
Pt = Et + (1  )Pt 1 (5)
where 0    1 is the natural rate of pollution absorption.
Preferences Individuals have time-additive lifetime well-being, which de-
pends on consumption per period. As usual, the utility of being dead is nor-
malized to 0. Hence, the lifetime well-being of short-lived individuals in cohort
t is:
Uslt = u(ct) (6)
where ct denotes the consumption at the young age for an individual in cohort
t. We assume, as usual, that u0() > 0 and u00() < 0.
For individuals in cohort t who turn out to be long-lived, lifetime well-being
is equal to:
U llt = u(ct) + u(dt+1) (7)
where dt+1 denotes the second-period consumption.
Following the existing literature (see Becker et al 2005), we assume that there
exists a non-negative consumption level that is neutral for the continuation of
existence. That neutral consumption level, denoted by c, is such that u(c) = 0.
Resource constraint At any point in time, the consumption and invest-
ment in the economy must be equal to the production:
F (Kt; Lt) = ctLt + dt (Pt 1)Lt 1 +Kt+1   (1  )Kt (8)
The pollution level a¤ects the resource constraint through the survival process
 (Pt 1). A low Pt 1 leads to a higher proportion of individuals reaching the
retirement period, and, hence, leads to a stronger pressure on available resources.
7On alternative ways to model pollution, see John and Pecchenino (1994) and John et al
(1995).
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3 The utilitarian optimum
In order to characterize the utilitarian optimum, we will concentrate on a sta-
tionary equilibrium. Given that the size of cohorts at birth is constant over time,
and equal to N , a stationary equilibrium consists here of a situation where all
variables - both in levels and in per worker terms - are constant over time.
Imposing Pt = Pt 1 in the pollution dynamics equation yields the following
stationary pollution stock:
P =
F (K;L)

=
Nf(k)

(9)
where k denotes the stationary capital per worker.
Moreover, the resource constraint becomes, at the stationary equilibrium:
F (K;N) = cN + d (P )N +K   (1  )K (10)
When rewritten in intensive terms, that expression becomes:
f(k)  k = c+ d (P ) (11)
In the light of this, the utilitarian social planners problem can be represented
as the selection of levels of consumptions, capital and pollution that maximize
average lifetime well-being at the stationary equilibrium, subject to the resource
constraint of the economy and subject to the stationary pollution level:
max
c;d;k;P
u(c) + (P )u(d)
s.t. f(k)  k = c+ d (P )
s.t. P =
Nf(k)

Given that P is a function of k, that problem can be rewritten as the selec-
tion of variables fc; d; kg maximizing average lifetime well-being subject to the
resource constraint of the economy. That problem can be rewritten by means
of the following Lagrangian:
max
c;d;k
u(c) + 

Nf(k)


u(d) + 

f(k)  k   c  d

Nf(k)


where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint. The
rst order conditions (FOCs) can be rewritten as:
u0(c) = u0(d) (12)
f 0(k) =    0

Nf(k)


Nf 0(k)

[u(d)  du0(d)]
u0(d)
(13)
as well as the conditions:
  0; f(k)  k  c+ d

Nf(k)


(14)
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with complementary slackness.
As stated in condition (12), the utilitarian optimum involves smoothed con-
sumption proles along the lifecycle. Regarding the optimal capital, the condi-
tion (13) is a modied version of the standard Golden Rule for optimal capital
accumulation (Phelps 1961). In standard OLG models without pollution, we
have 0 () = 0, and the condition for optimal capital is:
f 0(k) =  (15)
However, in our model, capital accumulation tends to deteriorate survival
chances (i.e. 0 () < 0), with the consequence that a second term is added on
the right-hand side (RHS) of the Golden Rule condition. That term, equal to:
 0

Nf(k)


Nf 0(k)

[u(d)  du0(d)]
u0(d)
(16)
is positive if and only if
u(d)  du0(d) > 0 (17)
That condition states that the marginal welfare gain from a higher survival
probability, i.e. u(d), must be higher, at the social optimum, than the marginal
welfare loss from a higher survival probability, i.e. du0(d).8
Whether u(d) is superior to du0(d) or not depends on several aspects of the
economy. First of all, it depends on the shape of the utility function u(). When
u() satises u(0)  0, it is always the case, given the concavity of u (), that
u(d) is superior to du0(d). However, we assume here that there exists c > 0
such that u(c) = 0, so that u(0) < 0. Hence we cannot rely only on the mere
concavity of u () to know whether u(d)  du0(d) ? 0.
Actually, under u(0) < 0, whether u(d)   du0(d) ? 0 depends on the level
of d, which is determined by the shape of the production function f (k). If the
production process brings high output levels, consumption levels are high, and
so it is likely that u(d) is high and u0(d) is low, leading to u(d) du0(d) > 0. On
the contrary, if the production process is not e¢cient, output and consumption
levels are low, leading potentially to d < c, implying that u(d) < du0(d). That
case coincides with an economy having a low production capacity, and where
consumption levels are below the threshold c making a life-period enjoyable.
In sum, two cases can arise. If the production capacity is su¢ciently e¢cient,
the socially optimal second-period consumption is su¢ciently high to guarantee
u(d)   du0(d) > 0. As a consequence, the optimal k is here lower than in the
absence of pollution. If, on the contrary, the production capacity is not e¢cient,
the optimal d is so low that u(d)  du0(d) < 0. Hence, in that case, the optimal
k is here higher than under the standard Golden Rule (i.e. in the absence of
pollution). Proposition 1 summarizes our results.
8Alternatively, that condition can be rewritten as:
u0(d)
u(d)
<
1
d
where the LHS is the fear of ruin, a measure of risk aversion.
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Proposition 1 If
lim
k!+1
f 0(k) = 0
and if
lim
k!0
f 0(k)
2
6666641 + 
0

Nf(0)


N

u

f(0)
1+( Nf(0) )

 
f(0)u0
 
f(0)
1+( Nf(0) )
!
1+( Nf(0) )
u0

f(0)
1+( Nf(0) )

3
777775 > 
an interior utilitarian social optimum fcu; du; ku; Pug exists and satises:
cu = du
f 0(ku) =    
0 (Pu)
Nf 0(ku)

[u(du)  duu
0(du)]
u0(du)
Pu =
Nf(ku)

f(ku)  ku = cu + du (Pu)
If u(du)   duu
0(du) > 0 (resp. < 0), we have ku lower (resp. higher) than
under the standard Golden Rule (0 () = 0).
Proof. Let us rewrite the FOC for optimal capital as:
f 0(k)

1 + 0

Nf(k)


N

[u(d)  du0(d)]
u0(d)

= 
Using d = du =
f(k) k
1+( Nf(k) )
, we can rewrite the LHS as:
(k) = f 0(k)
2
6641 + 0 () N

u

f(k) k
1+( Nf(k) )

  f(k) k1+() u
0

f(k) k
1+()

u0

f(k) k
1+()

3
775
Suppose that limk!+1 f
0(k) = 0. Then, we have:
lim
k!+1
(k) = 0 lim
k!+1
2
41 + 0 () N

h
u

f(k) k
1+()

  f(k) k1+() u
0

f(k) k
1+()
i
u0

f(k) k
1+()

3
5 = 0
Thus, when k ! +1, we have (k) < .
Consider now the case where k tends towards 0. The uniqueness of the
equilibrium requires that (k) is now larger than . This is achieved when:
lim
k!0
f 0(k)
2
6641 + 0

Nf(0)


N


u

f(0)
1+( Nf(0) )

  f(0)
1+( Nf(0) )
u0

f(0)
1+( Nf(0) )

u0

f(0)
1+( Nf(0) )

3
775 > 
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Under that condition, (k) >  when k ! 0 and (k) <  when k ! +1.
Hence there must exist, under that condition, some level of k such that (k) = .
Thus there exists (at least) one interior optimal level of k satisfying the FOC.
Once that level of k is known, the above FOCs can be used to derive the optimal
levels of c, d and P .
The utilitarian optimum involves at consumption proles along the lifecy-
cle, as well as a level of capital per worker lower than under the traditional
Golden Rule. This latter feature is the mere corollary of the presence of pol-
lution. In our model, capital accumulation a¤ects long-run average lifetime
welfare not only through its impact on long-run consumption possibilities (as
in the standard Golden Rule), but, also, it leads to pollution, which reduces
survival chances. Assuming u(du)  duu
0(du) > 0, this deterioration of survival
conditions a¤ects negatively the long-run average lifetime welfare. Hence, the
optimal k must be here lower than in the absence of pollution.
Proposition 1 only states the conditions under which there exists some in-
terior levels of c; d and k satisfying the optimality conditions associated with
the utilitarian social planning problem. However, those optimality conditions
may be satised by several quartets fc; d; k; Pg. Indeed, there may exist several
local maxima of steady-state average lifetime well-being. Only one of these local
maxima would be the global maximum, at which steady-state average lifetime
well-being is the highest. Hence, the conditions stated in Proposition 1 may not
be su¢cient to fully identify the utilitarian social optimum. This raises the fol-
lowing question: is there a unique quartet fc; d; k; Pg satisfying the conditions
stated in Proposition 1, or are there several quartets fc; d; k; Pg satisfying those
conditions? Proposition 2 examines that issue.
Proposition 2 Suppose that, for all k > 0, we have:
f 00(k) + f 00(k)0

Nf(k)


N

+f 0(k)

00

Nf(k)


Nf 0(k)

N

+ 0

Nf(k)


N

d
dk

< 0
with
 
u

f(k) k
1+( Nf(k) )

  f(k) k
1+( Nf(k) )
u0

f(k) k
1+( Nf(k) )

u0

f(k) k
1+( Nf(k) )

Then, there exists a unique quartet fcu; du; ku; Pug satisfying the conditions as-
sociated with the utilitarian social optimum.
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Proof. The condition for optimal capital is:
(k)  f 0(k)+
f 0(k)0

Nf(ku)


N

u

f(k) k
1+( Nf(k) )

 
(f(k) k)u0
 
f(k) k
1+( Nf(k) )
!
1+( Nf(k) )
u0

f(k) k
1+( Nf(k) )
 = 
Its RHS is a horizontal line at . From the existence conditions, we have that
(k) >  when k ! 0 and that (k) <  when k ! +1. Hence, the strict
monotonicity of the LHS in k guarantees that (k) =  for a unique level of k.
The monotonicity condition is 0(k) < 08k. This can be written as:
f 00(k) + f 00(k)0

Nf(k)


N

+f 0(k)

00

Nf(k)


Nf 0(k)

N

+ 0

Nf(k)


N

d
dk

< 0
with
 

u

f(k) k
1+( Nf(k) )

  f(k) k
1+( Nf(k) )
u0

f(k) k
1+( Nf(k) )

u0

f(k) k
1+( Nf(k) )

As shown in Proposition 2, the mere concavity of the production function
f 00(k) < 0 does not su¢ce, in the present context, to guarantee that the condi-
tions of Proposition 1 fully identify the utilitarian social optimum. The reason
why those conditions do not su¢ce lies in the fact that the survival probability
varies with capital accumulation. To see this, note that, if 0 () = 0, the mere
condition f 00(k) < 0 would su¢ce to guarantee that the conditions stated in
Proposition 1 identify the utilitarian social optimum.
Having examined the existence and uniqueness of the utilitarian social opti-
mum, let us now focus on a particular feature of that social optimum. At the
utilitarian optimum, a proportion  (Pu) of each cohort will turn out to have a
long life, whereas a proportion 1   (Pu) of each cohort will turn out to have a
short life, and will thus not enjoy the old age.
Those inequalities in longevity can lead to substantial inequalities in terms of
realized lifetime well-being. To see this, note that the realized lifetime well-being
of long-lived individuals is equal, at the utilitarian social optimum, to:
U ll = u(cu) + u(du) = 2u(cu) (18)
On the contrary, the realized lifetime well-being of short-lived individuals is:
Usl = u (cu) (19)
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Hence, short-lived individuals are, at the utilitarian social optimum, worst-
o¤ than long lived individuals when:
u (cu) > 0 () cu > c (20)
Using the resource constraint at the utilitarian social optimum, that condition
can be written as:
f(ku)  ku > c

1 + 

Nf(ku)


(21)
That condition is quite weak, since the neutral consumption level for con-
tinuing existence c is usually quite low. Note that the gap in realized lifetime
well-being u (cu) is decreasing with the level of  (). Thus, the more noxious
the production process is (the higher  is), the lower the proportion of survivors,
and the larger the gap in realized lifetime well-being u (cu) is. The extent of
well-being inequality at the utilitarian social optimum is also increasing with the
cohort size N , but is decreasing with the natural rate of pollution absorption .
4 The ex post egalitarian optimum
Utilitarianism tends, in the present context, to lead to signicant inequalities
in realized lifetime well-being between short-lived and long-lived individuals.
Those inequalities are not easy to justify. Actually, in our economy, all indi-
viduals are exactly identical ex ante, that is, before the duration of their life
is revealed. All individuals contribute, through the production process, to the
pollution. However, despite those common features, some individuals will turn
out to be short-lived, whereas others will, despite the pollution, enjoy the old
age. Thus, although all individuals are identical ex ante, there will be signicant
inequalities in longevity and in realized lifetime well-being.
Given that the unlucky short-lived individuals can hardly be regarded as
responsible for this, it makes sense to try to make those inequalities in realized
lifetime well-being as small as possible. Actually, as highlighted by Fleurbaey
(2008), inequalities due to circumstances - as opposed to inequalities for which
individuals can be regarded as responsible - should be minimized. This objective
is the one of the ex post egalitarian social planner. The problem of the ex post
egalitarian social planner consists in selecting levels of consumptions, capital
and pollution in such a way as to maximize the realized lifetime well-being of
the unlucky short-lived, while respecting the resource constraint of the economy.
Given that all members of a cohort are exactly identical ex ante (i.e. short-
lived and long-lived cannot be distinguished by the planner), the egalitarian
social planning problem can be written as:
max
c;d;k;P
min fu(c); u(c) + u(d)g
s.t. f(k)  k = c+ d (P )
s.t. P =
Nf(k)
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The objective function is continuous, but not di¤erentiable. This objec-
tive function is thus hardly tractable, but the social planning problem can be
rewritten in a di¤erent way. Actually, the condition u(d) = 0 is necessary and
su¢cient to achieve the equalization of lifetime well-being levels across all in-
dividuals in a cohort. In the light of that condition, it is possible to rewrite
the ex post egalitarian social planning problem in a simpler form, as the max-
imization of rst-period consumption subject to the resource constraint, and
subject to the egalitarian constraint that the lifetime welfare of long-lived indi-
viduals is not inferior to the lifetime well-being of short-lived individuals, that
is, u(c) + u(d)  u(c).9 Hence the ex post egalitarian social planning problem
can be rewritten by means of the following Lagrangian:
max
c;d;k
u(c) + 

f(k)  k   c  d

Nf(k)


+ u(d)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint, and
 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the egalitarian constraint. The
FOCs are:
u0(c) =  (22)
u0(d) = 

Nf(k)


(23)


f 0(k)     d0

Nf(k)


Nf 0(k)


= 0 (24)
as well as:
  0; f(k)  k  c+ d

Nf(k)


(25)
  0; u(d)  0 (26)
with complementary slackness.
The egalitarian condition can only be satised provided u(d) = 0, implying
that second-period consumption equals c. Regarding the optimal level of k, the
FOC can be rewritten as:
f 0(k) =  + c0

Nf(k)


Nf 0(k)

(27)
Given that the second term of the RHS is negative, it follows that f 0(k) <
. Thus the optimal level of k at the egalitarian social optimum is higher
than under the standard Golden Rule, and also higher than at the utilitarian
optimum. The intuition behind that result goes as follows. From the perspective
of maximizing the well-being of the unlucky short-lived, the pollution caused by
the accumulation of capital is a way to extent consumption possibilities for the
9Clearly, if long-lived agents were worst-o¤ than short-lived agents, maximizing the well-
being of the short-lived would not make sense.
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young, by reducing the inactive/active ratio. Note that the size of that e¤ect
depends on the level of the neutral consumption for continuing existence c. The
higher it is, the higher the optimal capital should be.
An important corollary of this concerns the socially optimal level of pollution.
Given that the optimal k is higher under ex post egalitarianism than under
utilitarianism, the optimal level of P is also higher under ex post egalitarianism.
That result may look surprising at rst glance, but it is actually quite intuitive
once it is understood that the size of rst-period consumption - the unique source
of well-being for unlucky short-lived persons - is limited by the size of aggregate
old-age consumption enjoyed by the lucky long-lived. Thus, from an egalitarian
perspective, pollution is a way to expand the consumption possibilities of the
unlucky. Proposition 3 summarizes our results.
Proposition 3 If
lim
k!+1
f 0(k) = 0
and if
lim
k!0

f 0(k)  c0

Nf(k)


Nf 0(k)


> 
an interior ex post egalitarian social optimum fce; de; ke; Peg exists and sat-
ises:
ce = f(ke)  ke   c (Pe)
de = c
f 0(ke) =  + c
0 (Pe)
Nf 0(ke)

Pe =
Nf(ke)

In comparison with the utilitarian social optimum (and assuming u(du)  
duu
0(du) > 0), we have:
cu ? ce
du > de = c
ku < ke
Pu < Pe
Proof. Let us rewrite the FOC for an interior optimal level of k as:
'(k)  f 0(k)  c0

Nf(k)


Nf 0(k)

= 
We have:
lim
k!+1
'(k) = 0  c0

Nf(k)


0 = 0 < 
lim
k!0
'(k) = f 0(0)  c0

Nf(0)


Nf 0(0)
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Hence, assuming
lim
k!0

f 0(k)  c0

Nf(k)


Nf 0(k)


> 
su¢ces to guarantee the existence of an interior optimal level of k. The rest
follows from the FOCs. The last part comes from comparing the FOCs for k
in the two planning problems. Under utilitarianism, we have, under u(du)  
duu
0(du) > 0:
f 0(ku) =    
0

Nf(ku)


Nf 0(ku)

[u(du)  duu
0(du)]
u0(du)
> 
while under ex post egalitarianism, we have:
f 0(ke) =  + c
0

Nf(ke)


Nf 0(ke)

< 
Hence it must be the case that ku < ke. Moreover, under u(du)  duu
0(du) > 0,
we have du > c = de: The rest follows from the FOCs.
Proposition 3 states that the interior ex post egalitarian optimum exhibits,
in general, a higher level of capital than at the utilitarian optimum, as well as a
higher pollution level. The reason why ex post egalitarianism leads to a higher
long-run pollution level lies in the fact that pollution allows for the widening
of the consumption possibilities at the young age, which is what matters for
compensating the unlucky short-lived individuals. Those larger consumption
possibilities at the young age come from the e¤ect of pollution on the age struc-
ture of the population. Pollution increases the active/inactive ratio, and, hence,
increase the consumption possibilities at the young age. This mechanism can
be called the "age-structure e¤ect".
Moreover, the shape of the consumption prole di¤ers quite a lot from the
one prevailing at the utilitarian optimum. The consumption prole was at
under utilitarianism, but it is now, under general conditions, decreasing with
the age. The underlying intuition is, here again, to minimize inequalities in
realized lifetime well-being between the short-lived and the long-lived.
Whereas Proposition 3 gives us conditions under which some quartet fc; d; k; Pg
satises the optimality conditions associated with an interior ex post egalitarian
optimum, it is possible that several quartets fc; d; k; Pg satisfy those conditions.
Proposition 4 identies the conditions under which one and only one quartet
fc; d; k; Pg satises those optimality conditions.
Proposition 4 Suppose that, for all k > 0, we have:
f 00(k)  c

00

Nf(k)


Nf 0(k)

Nf 0(k)

+ 0

Nf(k)


Nf 00(k)


< 0
then there exists a unique quartet fce; de; ke; Peg satisfying the conditions asso-
ciated with the ex post egalitarian social optimum.
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Proof. Take the FOC for optimal k :
'(k)  f 0(k)  c0

Nf(k)


Nf 0(k)

= 
From the existence conditions, we have that '(k) >  when k ! 0 and that
'(k) <  when k ! +1. Hence, the strict monotonicity of the LHS in k
guarantees that '(k) =  for a unique level of k. The monotonicity condition is
'0(k) < 08k. This can be written as:
'0(k) = f 00(k) c

00

Nf(k)


Nf 0(k)

Nf 0(k)

+ 0

Nf(k)


Nf 00(k)


< 0
If the survival probability was constant (i.e. 0() = 0), the concavity of f (k)
would su¢ce to guarantee that there exists only one local maximum, which is
also the global one. But given 0() < 0, this condition is not su¢cient to
guarantee that only one quartet fc; d; k; Pg satises the properties stated in
Proposition 3.
In sum, adopting the ex post egalitarian social objective instead of the stan-
dard utilitarian objective a¤ects signicantly the form of the long-run social
optimum, in particular regarding the optimal level of pollution. Once the goal
is to maximize the realized lifetime well-being of the unlucky short-lived, the
optimal level of pollution becomes larger. The intuition behind this result lies
in the impact of pollution on the age structure of the population, and, hence,
on the consumption possibilities at the young age.
5 Health expenditures
Up to now, we considered an economy where survival conditions are entirely
determined by the extent of pollution. Whereas pollution is a major determinant
of longevity, one may want to check whether our results are robust to considering
a more general survival function, where survival would depend not only on
pollution, but, also, on health expenditures. This section explores whether our
previous results are robust to the postulated survival function.
Survival conditions We now assume that the survival probability t+1
depends not only on pollution Pt, but, also, on health spending per worker,
denoted by ht. Those health spending are spent when individuals are working.
Hence, one can regard these expenditures as preventive health spending, in the
sense that those expenditures increase, ceteris paribus, the survival chances of
each individual:
t+1 =  (Pt; ht) (28)
with P < 0, PP < 0, h > 0, hh < 0 and hP > 0. This last assumption
states that the positive impact of preventive health spending on survival chances
is higher when the prevailing pollution level is higher.
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Resource constraint Once health expenditures are introduced, the re-
source constraint becomes:
F (Kt; Lt) = ctLt + htLt + dt (Pt 1; ht 1)Lt 1 +Kt+1   (1  )Kt (29)
At the steady-state and in intensive terms, that condition becomes:
f(k)  k = c+ h+ d (P; h) (30)
5.1 The utilitarian optimum revisited
The utilitarian social planning problem becomes:
max
c;d;h;k;P
u(c) + (P; h)u(d)
s.t. f(k)  k = c+ h+ d (P; h)
s.t. P =
Nf(k)

s.t. h  0
That problem can be rewritten by means of the following Lagrangian:
max
c;d;h;k
u(c)+

Nf(k)

; h

u(d)+

f(k)  k   c  h  d

Nf(k)

; h

+h
The FOCs are
u0(c) =  (31)


Nf(k)

; h

u0(d) = 

Nf(k)

; h

(32)
 
Nf 0(k)

P

Nf(k)

; h

u(d) = 

f 0(k)     dP

Nf(k)

; h

Nf 0(k)


(33)
h

Nf(k)

; h

u(d) +  = 

1 + dh

Nf(k)

; h

(34)
as well as the conditions
  0; f(k)  k   c  h  d

Nf(k)

; h

 0 (35)
  0; h  0 (36)
with complementary slackness.
From the FOCs for consumption, it follows that the utilitarian optimum
still involves here at consumption proles: c = d. Turning now to the FOC for
optimal k, note that this can be rewritten as:
f 0(k) =   
Nf 0(k)

P

Nf(k)

; h

u(d)  du0(d)
u0(d)

(37)
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That condition is quite similar to the one derived in Section 3. The unique
di¤erence lies in the fact that the marginal impact of capital on survival condi-
tions is a¤ected by the level of health spending h. Consider now the FOC for
health spending, which can be rewritten as:
h

Nf(k)

; h

u(d) +  = u0(c)

1 + dh

Nf(k)

; h

(38)
That condition states that there exists an interior optimal health spending
h only if there exists some h such that the marginal social welfare gain from
investing in health, equal to h

Nf(k)

; h

u(d), is exactly equal to the marginal
social welfare loss from investing in health, i.e. u0(c)
h
1 + dh

Nf(k)

; h
i
,
yielding  = 0. That loss depends on the foregone consumption at the young
age, and on the foregone consumption at the old age, due to a higher proportion
of retirees. That condition holds if and only if, for some h > 0, we have:
u0(c) = h

Nf(k)

; h

[u(d)  u0(d)d] (39)
Given that [u(d)  u0(d)d] is positive in an economy with large production ca-
pacity, this condition is likely to be satised, yielding an interior optimal level
for h. Note, however, that, in poor economies with limited production capacity,
it may be the case that the optimal d is below the neutral level c, leading to a
corner solution in health spending, i.e. h = 0.
Under an interior optimal level for h, the FOC for k can be rewritten as:
f 0(k) =   
Nf 0(k)

P

Nf(k)

; h

h

Nf(k)

; h
 (40)
That alternative formulation makes appear the central role played by the form
of the survival function  (P; h). If the derivative of  (P; h) with respect to P is,
in absolute value, small in comparison to the derivative of  (P; h) with respect
to the amount of health spending h, then the second term of the RHS is likely to
be quite small, so that the optimal k is then almost equal to its value according
to the standard Golden Rule. In the opposite case, the optimal k remains close
to the one derived in Section 3. Proposition 5 summarizes our results.
Proposition 5 An interior utilitarian optimum is a quintet fcu; du; hu; ku; Pug
satisfying the conditions:
cu = du
f 0(ku) =   
Nf 0(ku)

P (Pu; hu)
h (Pu; hu)
u0(cu) = h (Pu; hu) [u(du)  u
0(du)du]
f(ku)  ku = cu + hu + du (Pu; hu)
Pu =
Nf(ku)
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Proof. See the above FOCs.
Proposition 5 suggests that the introduction of health spending does not
a¤ect the key features of the utilitarian social optimum.10 First, the optimal
consumption prole remains at, as in the framework without health spending.
This means that, from a utilitarian point of view, the nancial e¤ort due to
health investment is spread equally across life-periods. Regarding the optimal
capital accumulation, the associated optimal capital level di¤ers, depending on
the form of the survival function. In the case, mentioned in the above discussion,
where jP (Pu; hu)j is small with respect to h (Pu; hu), the optimal capital
level is now higher than in the baseline model. As a consequence of this, the
optimal pollution level is also higher than in the absence of health spending. On
the contrary, if h (Pu; hu) is small in comparison to jP (Pu; hu)j, the optimal
pollution will remain close to the one derived in Section 3.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that, as in the baseline model, the util-
itarian social optimum is characterized by signicant inequalities in realized
lifetime well-being between short-lived and long-lived individuals. If one uses
the resource constraint, the welfare gap can be written as:
U ll   Usl = u

f(ku)  ku   hu
1 +  (Pu; hu)

(41)
It is not straightforward to see whether inequalities in lifetime well-being are
here larger or smaller than before. This depends strongly on the form of the
survival function  (Pu; hu).
5.2 The egalitarian optimum revisited
Whereas the extent to which the introduction of health spending a¤ects in-
equalities is ambiguous, those inequalities remain, in the present setting, as
hard to justify as in the framework without health spending. Actually, in the
extended model, individuals remain exactly equal ex ante, but, ex post, a frac-
tion  (Pu; hu) of them will enjoy the old age, whereas a fraction 1   (Pu; hu)
will die before reaching retirement. That di¤erential treatment remains, as in
the baseline model, quite arbitrary. Hence, an egalitarian social planner focusing
on realized individual achievements would like to minimize those inequalities.
Let us examine how the introduction of health spending a¤ects the ex post
egalitarian optimum. In the presence of health spending, that problem becomes:
max
c;d;k;h;P
min fu(c); u(c) + u(d)g
s.t. f(k)  k = c+ h+ d (P; h)
s.t. P =
Nf(k)

s.t. h  0
10Given that we are concerned here with the robustness of the comparison of optimal pol-
lution levels under the two social optima, we will not discuss here the existence of an interior
optimum. Moreover, we will also suppose that only one quintet fc; d; h; k; Pg satises the
optimality conditions, and leave discussions on local vs global maximum aside.
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The objective function is non di¤erentiable. However, as in the baseline
model, we can rewrite that problem as the maximization of rst-period con-
sumption subject to the resource constraint, and subject to the egalitarian con-
straint that the lifetime welfare of long-lived individuals is not inferior to the
lifetime well-being of short-lived individuals, that is, u(c) + u(d)  u(c).
That problem can be rewritten by means of the following Lagrangian:
max
c;d;h;k
u(c) + 

f(k)  k   c  h  d

Nf(k)

; h

+ u(d) + h
FOCs of that problem are:
u0(c) =  (42)


Nf(k)

; h

= u0(d) (43)
f 0(k) =  + dP

Nf(k)

; h

Nf 0(k)

(44)


1 + dh

Nf(k)

; h

=  (45)
as well as conditions
  0; f(k)  k   c  h  d

Nf(k)

; h

 0 (46)
  0; u(d)  0 (47)
  0; h  0 (48)
with complementary slackness.
From the FOC for health spending, we see that the optimal health investment
must be a corner solution. Indeed, that solution would be interior if the LHS of
the FOC was equal to 0, that is, if we had:


1 + dh

Nf(k)

; h

= 0
Using the FOC for c and the FOC for d, that expression can be written as:
u0(c) + u0(d)d
h

Nf(k)

; h



Nf(k)

; h
 = 0 (49)
That condition can never be achieved, since the two terms of the LHS are
necessarily positive. Thus we must have h = 0. The intuition behind that
result goes as follows. Health spending allow for the increase in the proportion
of survivors to the old age  (P; h). However, for the unlucky agents who do not
reach the old age, those health expenditures constitute a pure waste of resources,
since those spending reduced their purchasing power at the young age.
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Regarding the consumption prole, the egalitarian constraint implies u(d) =
0, so that it must be the case that d = c. Substituting for h = 0 and d = c in
the FOC for optimal capital, we obtain:
f 0(k) =  + cP

Nf(k)

; 0

Nf 0(k)

(50)
Let us compare that condition with the one prevailing under utilitarianism.
As the second term of the RHS is negative, the optimal capital is here higher
than under utilitarianism. To see this, remind that the FOC for optimal capital
in the utilitarian problem was:
f 0(k) =   
Nf 0(k)

P

Nf(k)

; h

u(d)  du0(d)
u0(d)

where the second term of the RHS is positive when u(d) du0(d) > 0. Thus, the
optimal level of capital remains higher under the ex post egalitarian optimum
than under the utilitarian optimum, even when health expenditures are intro-
duced. A major corollary of that result consists of the higher pollution level at
the ex post egalitarian optimum, in comparison to the utilitarian optimum.
Proposition 6 An ex post egalitarian optimum is a quintet fce; de; he; ke; Peg
satisfying the conditions:
ce = f(ke)  ke   c (Pe; 0)
de = c
he = 0
f 0(ke) =  + cP (Pe; 0)
Nf 0(ke)

Pe =
Nf(ke)

In comparison with the utilitarian optimum (under u(du)   duu
0(du) > 0), we
have:
cu ? ce
du > de = c
hu > he = 0
ku < ke
Pu < Pe
Proof. The proof of the rst part follows from the FOCs discussed above. The
proof of the second part is obtained by comparing the FOCs associated to the
utilitarian problem with the FOCs associated to the egalitarian problem.
As shown by Proposition 6, our main results are robust to the introduction
of preventive health spending. The optimal pollution level remains higher under
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the ex post egalitarian optimum than under the utilitarian optimum. Focusing
on the well-being of the unlucky short-lived supports thus some rise in the level
of pollution, in comparison with the utilitarian optimum. Although one may
nd this result counterintuitive, it should be reminded that, at the utilitarian
optimum, we have a lower pollution level, but at the cost of substantial inequal-
ities in lifetime well-being across individuals. On the contrary, under the ex post
egalitarian optimum, the situation of the unlucky short-lived is the best that
can be achieved given the structural parameters of the economy.
6 Decentralization
The present section is dedicated to the study of the decentralization of the
two social optima considered in this paper. For that purpose, we will rst
characterize the long-run equilibrium prevailing at the laissez-faire. Then, in
a second stage, we will examine the decentralization of the utilitarian social
optimum and of the ex post egalitarian optimum.
6.1 The laissez-faire
Let us consider here a two-period OLG economy with competitive markets,
including a perfect annuity market with actuarially fair returns. The laissez-
faire keeps the major assumptions made throughout this paper, regarding the
production technology, the survival process and the pollution process:
Yt = F (Kt; Lt) (51)
t+1 =  (Pt; ht) (52)
Pt = F (Kt; Lt) + (1  )Pt 1 (53)
Firms At the laissez-faire, competitive rms maximize their prots, so
that production factors are paid at their marginal productivity:
wt = f(kt)  ktf
0(kt) (54)
Rt = f
0(kt) + 1   (55)
where wt is the wage rate, and Rt is equal to 1 plus the interest rate.
Individuals At the laissez-faire, individuals select the levels of consump-
tions ct and dt+1, as well as their health spending ht, in such a way as to
maximize their expected lifetime well-being subject to their budget constraints.
The preferences of individuals can be represented by a function having the
expected utility form:
u (ct) +  (Pt; ht)u (dt+1) (56)
The rst-period budget constraint is:
wt = ct + ht + st (57)
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where st is individual savings.
Under a perfect annuity market, the gross return on savings R^t is:
R^t =
Rt
t (Pt 1; ht 1)
(58)
Hence the second-period budget constraint is:
stRt+1
t+1 (Pt; ht)
= dt+1 (59)
From the two budget constraints, we obtain the following intertemporal bud-
get constraint:
wt = ct + ht +
t+1 (Pt; ht) dt+1
Rt+1
(60)
The individuals problem can be written as the following Lagrangian:
max
ct;dt+1;ht
u (ct) +  (Pt; ht)u (dt+1) + 

wt   ct   ht  
t+1 (Pt; ht) dt+1
Rt+1

The FOCs are:
u0(ct) =  = Rt+1u
0 (dt+1) (61)
h (Pt; ht)u (dt+1) = 

1 +
h (Pt; ht) dt+1
Rt+1

(62)
Using those FOCs, the optimal level of health spending satises:
u0(ct) = h (Pt; ht) [u (dt+1)  u
0 (dt+1) dt+1] (63)
The LHS is the marginal welfare loss from investing in health, while the RHS is
the marginal welfare gain from investing in health.
Intertemporal equilibrium The intertemporal equilibrium is a sequence
of prices, individual and aggregate variables satisfying all equilibrium conditions.
Firms maximize their prots, leading to the two conditions (54) and (55), and
individuals maximize their expected utility, leading to conditions (61) and (63).
In addition, the capital stock equals savings plus the undepreciated capital:
Kt+1 = Nst + (1  )Kt (64)
The labor market clears:
Lt = N (65)
The goods market clears:
F (Kt; N) + (1  )Kt = Nct +Nht +N (Pt; ht) dt +Kt+1 (66)
The dynamic equation for pollution holds (equation (53)).
At time 0, the consumption of old agents satises:
d0 =
R0s 1
 (P0; h 1)
(67)
We take as given the initial capital stock K0 = Ns 1, the initial pollution
stock P 1 and the initial health spending h 1.
22
Stationary equilibrium Let us, for the sake of our policy analysis, sup-
pose that there exists a unique and stable stationary equilibrium. At the sta-
tionary equilibrium, and given the constancy of the cohort size, all aggregate
and individual variables are constant. The resource constraint of the economy
is, in intensive terms:
f(k)  k = c+ h+  (P; h) d (68)
whereas pollution is equal to:
P =
Nf(k)

(69)
Prot maximization by competitive rms imply:
w = f(k)  kf 0(k) (70)
R = f 0(k) + 1   (71)
Utility maximization by individuals imply
u0(c) = Ru0 (d) (72)
u0(c) = h (P; h) [u (d)  u
0 (d) d] (73)
6.2 Decentralization of the utilitarian optimum
Remind that, at the utilitarian social optimum, we have:
u0(cu)
u0(du)
= 1 (74)
f 0(ku) =   
Nf 0(ku)

P (Pu; hu)
h (Pu; hu)
(75)
u0(cu) = h (Pu; hu) [u(du)  u
0(du)du] (76)
Comparing those FOCs with the ones prevailing at the laissez-faire, it can
be shown that the decentralization of the long-run utilitarian optimum requires
the design of an adequate tax  on capital income. The goal of that tax is to
internalize pollution externalities. Under a tax  , the FOCs prevailing at the
laissez-faire become:
u0(c) = (R  )u0 (d) (77)
u0(c) = h (P; h) [u (d)  u
0 (d) d] (78)
The comparison of the FOC for savings with its counterpart at the utilitarian
social optimum suggests that we need  such that R    = 1. Given that, in a
competitive economy, R = f 0(k) + 1  , the tax  must satisfy:
f 0(k)      = 0 (79)
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Given that, at the utilitarian optimum, we have:
f 0(ku) =   
Nf 0(ku)

P (Pu; hu)
h (Pu; hu)
it follows that the optimal tax must be equal to:
u =  
Nf 0(ku)

P (Pu; hu)
h (Pu; hu)
> 0
The optimal tax on capital income is strictly positive. Its level depends on
the shape of the survival function, and, in particular, on the sensitivity of the
survival probability to pollution and health spending at the utilitarian social
optimum. The higher the ratio P (Pu;hu)
h(Pu;hu)
is, the higher the optimal tax on capital
income is, since, in that case, pollution generates a larger externality, which thus
requires a stronger correction. The optimal tax on capital income is, ceteris
paribus, increasing in the extent to which production is noxious (parameter ),
and decreasing with the natural rate of absorption (parameter ), because a
higher  and a lower  increase the size of the negative externality associated
to pollution. Moreover, u is increasing with the size of each cohort N , since a
larger population leads to a larger negative externality of pollution, and, hence,
requires a higher correcting tax.
The tax u cannot su¢ce, on its own, to decentralize the utilitarian social
optimum. One also needs an intergenerational transfer device that leads to
the optimal long-run capital level ku. Since capital accumulation leads to more
health-damaging pollution, the optimal capital level is here lower than under the
standard Golden Rule, as discussed above. Once  = u and k = ku, it is easy
to see that the decentralized level of health spending is also equal to its socially
optimal level hu. Hence no other scal instrument is needed to decentralize the
long-run utilitarian social optimum.
Proposition 7 The utilitarian optimum can be decentralized by means of:
 a tax on capital income satisfying the condition:
u =  
Nf 0(ku)

P (Pu; hu)
h (Pu; hu)
> 0
 an intergenerational transfer device leading to:
f 0(ku) =   
Nf 0(ku)

P (Pu; hu)
h (Pu; hu)
Proof. See above.
Proposition 7 states that the utilitarian social optimum can be decentralized
by means of a tax on capital income and by means of intergenerational transfers
aimed at generating the socially optimal capital intensity. If one takes the
utilitarian criterion as an intuitive social objective, then the policy instruments
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described in Proposition 7 constitute the optimal environmental policy. Note,
however, that, under those scal instruments, some substantial inequalities in
lifetime well-being remain between long-lived and short-lived individuals. The
rest of this section aims at comparing the optimal policy under utilitarianism
with the policy decentralizing the ex post egalitarian social optimum.
6.3 Decentralization of the ex post egalitarian optimum
Remind that, at the ex post egalitarian optimum, we have:
u0(ce)
u0(de)
=



Nf(k)

; 0
 (80)
f 0(ke) =  + cP (Pe; 0)
Nf 0(ke)

(81)
he = 0 (82)
where  denotes the shadow social value of relaxing the egalitarian constraint.
When that constraint is binding, we have  > 0 and de = c.
Comparing those conditions with the ones prevailing at the laissez-faire, it
is straightforward to see that the decentralization of the ex post egalitarian
optimum requires the design of an adequate tax  on capital income. Given
that u0(c) = (R  )u0(d) prevails at the laissez-faire, the optimal tax  must
here satisfy:
R   =



Nf(k)

; 0
 (83)
Given that, in a competitive economy, R = f 0(k)+1  , the tax  must satisfy:
f 0(k) + 1      =



Nf(k)

; 0
 (84)
Hence, at the optimal capital level, which is such that f 0(ke) = +cP (Pe; 0)
Nf 0(ke)

,
the optimal tax must satisfy the condition:
e = cP (Pe; 0)
Nf 0(ke)

+
0
@1  


Nf(ke)

; 0

1
A > 0 (85)
The rst term of that expression is negative, while the sign of the second
term is positive, since u
0(ce)
u0(de)
< 1. In order to interpret that expression, note
that, in the absence of any pollution, we would have:
e = 1 



Nf(ke)

; 0
 > 0
That tax on capital income has, in the absence of pollution, a unique role,
which is to decentralize the optimal consumption prole. Clearly, in the absence
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of tax ( = 0), individuals would, at the laissez-faire, smooth their consumption
proles (c = d). This at consumption prole does not coincide at all with the
consumption prole prevailing at ex post egalitarian optimum, where the ratio
u0(ce)
u0(de)
= 
() < 1. Given that, at the ex post egalitarian optimum, second-period
consumption is equal to c, which is, in general, much lower than ce, the ratio

() < 1 is likely to be very small. Hence, in that case, the optimal tax on
capital income will be quite close - but inferior - to 1. The optimal tax is thus,
in that case, strictly positive. Actually, taxing capital income is a simple way
to reduce individual savings, so as to maximize the well-being of the unlucky
short-lived.
Consider now the additional impact of pollution. Once pollution exists and
deteriorates survival conditions, the rst term of the formula for e is negative,
and thus leads to a reduction of the optimal tax on capital income. The intuition
behind that - somewhat surprising - result goes as follows. From an ex post
egalitarian perspective, what matters is to promote consumption possibilities at
the young age. Hence, pollution, by making the surviving inactive old relatively
less numerous with respect to the active young, tends to expand consumption
possibilities at the young age. This explains why pollution tends here to reduce
the optimal level of the capital income tax. Thus, the impact of pollution on
the age structure has here the e¤ect of reducing the optimal capital income tax.
Given that this additional e¤ect supports the subsidization - instead of the
taxation - of capital income, the magnitude of the optimal level e in the pres-
ence of pollution is ambiguous. Two opposite forces are at work. On the one
hand, taxing capital income pushes individuals to save less, so that the chosen
consumption prole becomes close to the decreasing consumption prole pre-
vailing at the ex post egalitarian optimum. On the other hand, taxing capital
income reduces pollution, which implies that the age-structure of the population
becomes less favorable to the consumption possibilities of the young. Those two
opposite forces determine the level of the optimal capital income tax. Note that
the sign of e is likely to be strictly positive, since f
0(k) > 0 for any k implies
that
cP (Pe; 0) Nf 0(ke)
 <  < 1. Hence the second term - the positive one -
in the tax formula is likely to exceed the rst term - the negative one -, leading
to a positive tax on capital income e > 0.
Moreover, as in the decentralization of the utilitarian optimum, the optimal
capital income tax does not su¢ce to decentralize the social optimum. Actually,
the decentralization of the optimal capital intensity ke requires, here again, a
device of intergenerational transfers. Given that the optimal capital per worker
is higher under the ex post egalitarian optimum than under the utilitarian op-
timum, the system of intergenerational transfers must here be adapted to the
level of capital that is to be decentralized.
Finally, let us now consider the decentralization of the optimal level of health
spending. Substituting for c = ce, d = de = c,  = e and for k = ke in the
FOC for health investment at the laissez-faire yields:
u0(ce) = h (Pe; h) [0  u
0(c)c] (86)
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The LHS is strictly positive. The RHS of that relation is strictly negative.
Hence that condition for an interior optimal h cannot be satised. Thus, once
the optimal consumption prole has been decentralized, the marginal welfare
gain from investing in health becomes negative at the laissez-faire (RHS), and
is always lower than the marginal welfare loss of investing in health (LHS).
Hence, individuals opt for a corner level of health spending equal to zero. This
coincides with the optimal health spending at the ex post egalitarian optimum.
Therefore, no additional policy instrument is needed to decentralize the ex post
egalitarian social optimum. Proposition 8 summarizes our results.
Proposition 8 The ex post egalitarian optimum can be decentralized by means
of:
 a tax on capital income satisfying the condition:
e = cP (Pe; 0)
Nf 0(ke)

+
0
@1  


Nf(ke)

; 0

1
A > 0
 an intergenerational transfer device leading to:
f 0(ke) =  + cP (Pe; 0)
Nf 0(ke)

Proof. See above.
Propositions 7 and 8 show that the optimal tax on capital income vary sig-
nicantly depending on the social objective. Obviously, the precise magnitudes
of u and e depend on the particular functional forms postulated for f(),  ()
and u (). However, since the reasons for intervening are di¤erent under the
two social objectives, the optimal tax rates are also likely to di¤er substantially.
Whereas u is increasing with the sensitivity of the survival conditions to pol-
lution (i.e. P ()), e is decreasing with that sensitivity. The intuition behind
that result goes as follows. The utilitarian criterion assigns a signicant weight
to the increase of the proportion of individuals reaching the old age. From
that perspective, a higher sensitivity of  to pollution requires a higher tax
on capital income, in order to reduce pollution and to increase life expectancy.
On the contrary, the ex post egalitarian social objective is only concerned with
increasing the consumption possibilities at the young age. From that alterna-
tive perspective, a higher sensitivity of  to pollution supports a lower taxation
of capital income, since this pollution favors a more pyramidal age-structure,
which is more favorable to the compensation of the unlucky short-lived.
The comparison of u and e depends on the structure of individual pref-
erences. The neutral level of consumption for continuing existence c plays an
important role. When c is low (implying a high value assigned to survival by
individuals), the optimal tax e decentralizing the ex post egalitarian optimum
is likely to be high, and higher than u. On the contrary, when c is high, the
age-structure e¤ect becomes more sizeable, making e closer to u.
27
7 Conclusions
Pollution is a major cause of mortality. It generates large inequalities in terms of
human longevity and in terms of lifetime well-being. The goal of this paper was
to compare the optimal public policy under two social objectives: on the one
hand, the standard utilitarian social objective, and, on the other hand, the ex
post egalitarian social objective, which aims at maximizing the realized lifetime
well-being of the worst-o¤.
For that purpose, we developed a two-period OLG model with capital ac-
cumulation, with pollution induced by production, and where pollution reduces
life expectancy. Focusing on the long-run, we characterized the optimal station-
ary equilibrium under the two social welfare functions, and we examined their
decentralization by means of simple scal instruments.
The comparison the rst-best social optima showed that the optimal level
of pollution is higher under the ex post egalitarian optimum than under the
utilitarian optimum. The intuition behind that result lies in the fact that the
ex post egalitarian social objective lays an exclusive emphasis on the extension
of consumption possibilities at the young age of life. Those consumption possi-
bilities depend on the active/inactive ratio, which is increasing with pollution.
This age-structure e¤ect explains why the optimal capital is larger under the
ex post egalitarian optimum than under the utilitarian optimum, leading to a
higher optimal level of pollution.
On the policy side, the decentralization of each social optimum requires
intergenerational transfers aimed at obtaining the optimal capital level, as well
as taxes on capital income. However, the determinants of optimal capital income
taxes were shown to di¤er, depending on the underlying social objective. From
the utilitarian point of view, taxing capital income is a way to make individuals
internalize the negative externalities, in terms of life expectancy, associated to
capital accumulation in a polluted economy. From the point of view of ex post
egalitarianism, taxing capital income is justied on the grounds that it allows
for the decentralization of the decreasing consumption prole associated with
the egalitarian optimum.
All in all, the optimal policy in a polluted economy depends strongly on the
underlying social welfare criterion. Whereas that result could be expected, the
main contribution of this paper was to identify the various determinants of the
optimal scal instruments to be used for the decentralization of the social optima
under comparison. Obviously, the optimal level of scal instruments depends on
the postulated functional forms for the production function, for preferences and
for the survival function. However, our analytical ndings suggest that di¤erent
social welfare criteria lead to quite di¤erent optimal policies. How a society
deals with its pollution remains, at the end of the day, a matter of social choice.
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